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Minimizing the Costs of Patent Trolling
Vincent R. Johnson

I.

INTRODUCTION
It is widely argued that patent trolling is a serious legal problem that needs to be

addressed, at least in the United States, where the practice is most prevalent.1 This paper argues
that disclosure requirements and periodic reporting standards have important roles to play in
minimizing the costs of patent trolling. This is true for two reasons. First, the targets of trolling
often lack basic information that is relevant to their evaluation of the claims against them. To
that extent, targets are handicapped in protecting their own interests via litigation, licensing, or
other means. Second, policymakers know too little about specialized patent assertion entities
and their impact on innovation and technology. This dearth of information needlessly hampers
the formulation of legislative solutions to the perceived abuses that result from trolling.
Part II describes patent trolling and its estimated costs to society. Part III discusses the
nature of possible reforms. Part IV considers deficiencies in patent law that make the legal
system vulnerable to trolling. Part V addresses obstacles that constrain reform efforts. Part VI
explores two legal options for minimizing the costs of patent trolling: (1) expanded civil liability



Professor of law, St. Mary’s University, San Antonio, Texas (vjohnson@stmarytx.edu). J.D. University of Notre
Dame; LL.M., Yale University; LL.M. candidate, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). The
author gratefully acknowledges the insights that he gained into this topic in Dr. Sivaramjani Thambisetty’s course on
Innovation, Technology, and Patent Law in the LSE Executive LL.M. Programme. Four law students at St. Mary’s
University helped with the preparation of this article: Melinda Uriegas, Luis Medina, Olivia Mallary, and Theresa
Clarke.
1
See Christian Helmers et al., Is There a Patent Troll Problem in the U.K.?, 24 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 509, 510-15 (2014) (“Conventional wisdom states that ‘patent trolls’ . . . are a uniquely American
phenomenon. . . . [L]awsuits involving NPEs are indeed rare in the U.K., but hardly non-existent.”).
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for deceptive nondisclosure and (2) new registration and reporting requirements similar to those
often imposed on lobbyists. Part VII offers a final assessment.

II.

THE PERCEIVED THREAT
A. The Basic Problem
Although the terminology varies,2 “patent trolling” generally refers to infringement

allegations made by a person who holds, but does not work, the patent in question.3 The maker
of the allegations is often referred to as a “troll” because the maker seeks to ensnare, with threats
of liability, others who have strayed into the uncertain thickets of patent law.4 Trolls, it is said,
often deliberately wait5 until producers have made expensive and difficult-to-change investments
in new technologies that are purportedly (and presumably unexpectedly) covered by a patent.6
This is the point when a cease and desist letter arrives.7

Anna Mayergoyz, Lessons from Europe on How to Tame U.S. Patent Trolls, 42 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 241, 245
(2009) (“Most frequently, [‘patent troll’] refers to an entity that threatens an infringement suit against productmanufacturing companies without using or having the potential to use the patent itself.”) (emphasis added).
3
See Cascades Computer Innovation LLC v. RPX Corp., No. 12-CV-01143 YGR, 2013 WL 316023, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. Jan. 24, 2013) (defining a “patent troll” as “an entity that ‘enforces patent rights against accused infringers in an
attempt to collect licensing fees, but does not manufacture products or supply services based upon the patents in
question’”); Overstock.com, Inc. v. Furnace Brook, LLC, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1218 (D. Utah 2005), aff’d 191 F.
App’x 959 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“A patent troll is somebody who tries to make a lot of money off a patent that they are
not practicing and have no intention of practicing and . . . [have] never practiced.”) (alteration in original) (quoting
Elizabeth D. Ferrill, Comment, Patent Investment Trusts: Let’s Build a PIT to Catch the Patent Trolls, 6 N.C. J.L. &
TECH. 367, 367 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
4
See Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 1 (2012) (“[A] reference
to the children’s tale of the three billy goats who must pay a toll to the troll waiting under the bridge if they wish to
pass.”); 151 Cong. Rec. 11,986 (daily ed. June 8, 2005) (statement of Rep. Howard L. Berman) (“The patent troll . .
. steps out of the shadows and demands that the alleged infringer pay a significant licensing fee to avoid an
infringement suit”).
5
DAVID I. BAINBRIDGE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 397 (9th ed. 2012) (describing patent trolling as the practice of
“obtaining the grant of a patent and then sitting on it, waiting for an unsuspecting third party to make something or
do something which might fall within the scope of the patent” and then “threatening patent litigation unless a license
is taken out”).
6
See Stefania Fusco, Markets and Patent Enforcement: A Comparative Investigation of Non-Practicing Entities in
the United States and Europe, 20 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 439, 444 (2014) (“irreversible investments”).
7
Id. at 444.
2
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Regardless of the merits of an infringement claim, the “targets” of trolling often
reluctantly purchase licenses allowing them to use allegedly infringed technologies.8 Doing so is
usually much less expensive 9 than the considerable costs of redesigning products to use
alternative technologies,10 defending a patent infringement claim,11 or seeking a declaratory
judgment of non-infringement.12 In litigation, defense expenses can sometimes run into the
hundreds of thousands13 or millions of dollars.14 Buying a license also allows targets to avoid
the substantial risks of being found liable for patent infringement in courtrooms where there are
many unpredictable legal and factual variables. Licensing fees are often considered “excessive”
in relation “to the contribution of the asserted patents to the allegedly infringed product[s].”15
Yet, there may be no other good alternative to licensing if, as is often the case, the “manufacturer
has already invested the sunk costs of bringing a product to market.”16

8

See Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of Innovation, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1809, 1813 (2007) (“[M]ost of these cases never get to court. So long as there is significant
uncertainty about whether an infringement suit will succeed, defendants will tend to settle.”).
9
Joel B. Carter, Responding to a Patent Troll’s Threats, 48 ARK. LAW., Summer 2013, 30 (explaining that the
licensing royalty is often “much less than the alleged infringer would pay defending a claim”).
10
See Fusco, supra note 6, at 444 (“very high switching costs”).
11
See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 5, at 397 (“notoriously expensive”).
12
Under American law, a declaratory judgment may be obtained in a patent infringement suit if there is real
adversity between the parties. See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Acceleron LLC, 587 F.3d 1358, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(permitting action). However, “a communication from a patent owner to another party, merely identifying its patent
and the other party’s product line, without more, cannot establish adverse legal interests between the parties, let
alone the existence of a ‘definite and concrete’ dispute.” Id. at 1362 (quoting MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,
549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007)). Thus, federal courts often lack jurisdiction to adjudicate declaratory judgment claims
against patent trolls that send demand letters from other states. See Overstock.com, Inc. v. Furnace Brook, LLC,
420 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1218-21 (D. Utah 2005), aff’d 191 F. App’x 959 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
13
See Assemb. 2462, 216th Leg., 1st Ann. Sess. § 1(f) (N.J. 2014) (“[P]atent litigation . . . may cost hundreds of
thousands of dollars or more.”); see also Michael Booth, N.J. Lawmakers Push Bill Aiming to Curtail Patent Trolls,
N.J.L.J. (Oct. 3, 2014), http://www.njlawjournal.com/id=1202672354924/NJ-Lawmakers-Push-Bill-Aiming-ToCurtail-Patent-Trolls (indicating that the Assembly Commerce and Economic Development Committee
“unanimously recommended passage of a bipartisan bill, A-2462”).
14
See Helmers, supra note 1, at 512 n.4 (citing AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC
SURVEY 2011 at I-155-56) (“[T]he median cost of defending a U.S. patent case is about $2.5 million.”).
15
Christian Helmers & Luke McDonagh, Trolls at the High Court?, LSE LAW, SOCIETY, AND ECONOMY WORKING
PAPERS, Sept. 23, 2012, at 2, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2154958.
16
See id.
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B. Terminology
The term “patent troll” is inevitably pejorative and, in certain cases, unfair. Thus, the use
of the term is sometimes prohibited in litigation as unduly prejudicial17 and neutral labels such as
“non-practicing entity” (NPE) or “patent assertion entity” (PAE) are preferred.18 Nevertheless,
references to “trolls” and “trolling” persist in scholarly literature, probably because they are
convenient ways of signaling complex concepts.19 These terms occasionally appear in court
opinions, but those occurrences are comparatively rare.

C. The Costs of Patent Trolling
Patent trolling is now big business and the alleged costs to the public are staggering. A
recent estimate indicates that “trolls cost society approximately $30 billion per year and have
cost a total of $500 billion over the past twenty years.”20 Other studies place the costs higher. 21
There is little evidence that the payouts secured by trolls via licensing and other settlements are
reinvested into research or development of new technology. 22 Thus, trolling appears to do little
to promote innovation, and instead makes existing products and services more expensive by
increasing the costs for producers.

17

See DNT, LLC v. Sprint Spectrum, LP, No. 3:09CV21, 2010 WL 582164, at *4 (E.D. Va. Feb. 12, 2010)
(granting plaintiff’s motion to preclude the use of the term “patent troll” because “the prejudicial impact outweighs
any probative value”).
18
HTC Corp. v. Tech. Properties Ltd., No. 5:08-CV-00882-PSG, 2013 WL 4782598, *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2013).
19
See Fusco, supra note6, at 440-41 (referring variously to “trolls” and “non-practicing entities”).
20
Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2119
(2013) (citation omitted).
21
James Bessen, Jennifer Ford & Michael J. Meurer, The Private and Social Costs of Patent Trolls, REGULATION,
Winter 2011-2012, at 26, 35 (“[D]efendants have lost over half a trillion dollars in wealth—over $83 billion per year
during recent years.”).
22
See, e.g., Overstock.com, Inc., v. Furnace Brook, LLC, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1222 (D. Utah 2005), aff’d 191 F.
App’x 959 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[Patentee, an alleged patent troll,] made no efforts to practice its patent or otherwise
enhance the technology”).
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Patent trolling is regarded as a serious problem, particularly in the “pharmaceutical and
biotech industries,”23 and other high tech sectors.24 In the United States,
“PricewaterhouseCoopers estimates that about 67 percent of all patent infringement cases
nationwide are filed by patent trolls.”25 More than 100,000 American companies may have been
threatened with patent infringement in 2013 alone.26 Threats of infringement are used to target
not only large27 and small producers of goods and services, but also “the end users of products,
including many small businesses.”28 The costs associated with patent trolling in the United
States are said to have “increased fourfold in the past decade.”29 However, some scholars
believe that cost estimates have been exaggerated. 30
One ominous recent development is the emergence of patent mass aggregators, 31
secretive entities that hold vast portfolios and sometimes engage in trolling activities.32 This
type of trolling may be the shape of the future. In that world, trolling might become even more

23

Booth, supra note 13.
See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 387, 388
(2014) (“NPE litigation imposes substantial direct costs on high-tech innovators with little apparent offsetting
benefit to inventors or innovators . . . .”).
25
Booth, supra note 13; but see Helmers, supra note 1, at 525 (“studies have estimated that NPEs were responsible
for roughly 25% of U.S. patent suits” between 2000 and 2010).
26
Assemb. 2462, 216th Leg., 1st Ann. Sess. § 1(c) (N.J. 2014).
27
See, e.g., Overstock.com, 420 F. Supp. 2d at 1218 (noting that patentee, an alleged patent troll, “purchased its
patent at a bankruptcy auction . . . and, without any apparent attempts to practice it, . . . sent infringement letters to,
among others, Williams-Sonoma, Inc.; Sharper Image Corporation; Gap, Inc.; Spiegel, Inc.; Eddie Bauer, Inc.; L.L.
Bean, Inc.; and Ann Taylor Stores Corporation . . . [some of which] apparently led to license agreements”).
28
N.J. Assemb. 2462 § 1(d).
29
Carter, supra note 9, at 30; see also Bessen & Meurer, supra note 24, at 408 (“Aggregate direct costs of NPE
patent assertions grew rapidly from about $7 billion in 2005 to $29 billion in 2011.”).
30
David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing Entities in the Patent System, 99
CORNELL L. REV. 425, 455 (2014) (“Bessen and Meurer’s study provides some new data for discussion . . . [but]
should be viewed sceptically . . . and . . . is likely to be substantially overstated.”).
31
See Ewing & Feldman, supra note 4, at 1 (“In a few short years, a handful of entities have amassed vast treasuries
of patents on an unprecedented scale . . . [as many as] 30,000-60,000 patents worldwide . . . .”).
32
See id. at 15 (“Acacia Research Corporation . . . the first modern mass aggregator . . . has been among the most
litigious of the non-practicing entities.”).
24
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common than it is today, carried out by ever-larger entities that levy a “tax on current
production,”33 sapping the energy and resources that are vital to innovation.
It is not difficult to see that trolling poses a threat to the efficacy of the current
international regime under which, via the GATT34 and its TRIPS accord,35 patent law is used to
catalyze innovation through the development of new technologies across the globe.36 The
amounts that are paid to settle trolling claims are “no longer available to invest, produce new
products, expand, or hire new workers.”37 Threats of litigation by patent assertion entities are
commonly viewed as “a disruptive force with respect to product market competition and
innovation.”38

III.

THE NATURE OF THE CHALLENGE
A. Systemic Versus Targeted Reform
The outpouring of complaints about trolling is so great as to call into question

fundamental aspects of patent law.39 Thus, it would be fair to ask, as some have, whether serious
mistakes were made in structuring governmental incentives for innovation as transferrable

Id. at 41; see id. at 25 (“[M]ass aggregation activities . . . [may] act as a multiplier for the worst aspects of the
present system . . . .”).
34
See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization annex 1A: General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1153, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187.
35
See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization annex 1C: Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Jan. 1, 1995, 33 I.L.M. 1200, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 (“The protection and
enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation . . . .”).
36
Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2821, 2824-25 (2006)
(discussing “intellectual property globalization” and impact of patent law on “innovation and economic growth”).
37
Assemb. 2462, 216th Leg., 1st Ann. Sess. § 1(i) (N.J. 2014).
38
Christian Helmers & Luke McDonagh, Patent Litigation in the UK 2 (London Sch. of Econ. & Political Sci., LSE
Law, Society and Econ. Working Paper No. 12/2012, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2154939.
39
See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 24, at 421 (“The rapid growth and high cost of NPE litigation documented here
should set off an alarm, warning policymakers that the patent system still needs significant reform to make it a truly
effective system for promoting innovation.”).
33
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property rights,40 endowing patents with a presumption of validity,41 imposing strict liability for
infringement,42 and awarding patents for fragmentary improvements in technical processes.43
Perhaps governments, rather than granting limited term monopolies in the form of patent
rights, would do better to pay inventors of important technologies a fixed sum reward44 or to
abandon the idea of incentives entirely. 45 Perhaps patent applicants should be held to more
exacting standards.46 Perhaps holders alleging infringement should be required to prove that
their patents are valid47 and that alleged infringers acted culpably in violating their rights.
Perhaps patent holders suing in United States federal courts should be required to prove that they
are involved in an industry or post a bond to “compensate the defendant for attorney’s fees in the
event of a favorable result for the defendant.”48 These and other suggestions for fundamental
reform have been made by thoughtful writers.

See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 20, at 2122 (“Patents can be bought and sold, and they can be enforced by
whichever party owns them at the time.” (citation omitted)).
41
“Under § 282 of the Patent Act of 1952, ‘[a] patent shall be presumed valid’ and ‘[t]he burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity.’” Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd.
P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011) (alterations in original) (proceeding to hold holding that invalidity must be
proved by clear and convincing evidence).
42
See Magliocca, supra note 8, at 1815 (“[P]atent law holds a defendant liable for infringement even if it does not
know that an item is patented . . . . [and] actually imposes strict liability.”).
43
See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 20, at 2121 (“[M]any of the problems associated with trolls are in fact
problems that stem from the disaggregation of complementary patents (patents that cover technologies used together
in the same products) into too many different hands.”); id. at 2147-48 (“Google’s chief legal officer estimated . . .
that a smartphone uses technologies claimed by 250,000 different patents . . . .”).
44
See William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF
PROPERTY 168, 181 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001) (discussing the option of paying innovators a sum out of tax
revenues); Fritz Machlup & Edith Penrose, The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century, 10 J. ECON. HIST. 1,
19 (1950) (“[O]ne might . . . reject patent privileges and support a system of cash prizes or bonuses paid to
meritorious inventors.”).
45
See Eric E. Johnson, Intellectual Property and the Incentive Fallacy, 39 FLA. STATE U. L. REV. 623, 644 (2012)
(“[T]he destructive effect of extrinsic incentives on innovation and creativity is well established.”).
46
See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 20, at 2152 (discussing raising “the bar to patentability”).
47
But see Taurus IP, LLC v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 726 F.3d 1306, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“After an accused
infringer has put forth a prima facie case of invalidity, the burden of production shifts to the patent owner . . . [but
the] ultimate burden of proving invalidity by clear and convincing evidence—i.e., the burden of persuasion—
however, remains with the accused infringer.”) (emphasis added and omitted).
48
Tina M. Nguyen, Lowering the Fare: Reducing the Patent Troll’s Ability to Tax the Patent System, 22 FED. CIR.
B.J. 101, 125 (2012).
40
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However, many critics of patent trolling have argued not for a fundamental restructuring
of patent law, but for responses more closely targeted to the problem of patent trolling.49 They
have focused on identifying and impeding the villains who purportedly are responsible for the
present crisis. Their goal is to make it more difficult for the bad actors to profit from patent
trolling.

B. Focus on Non-Practicing Entities
There is a broad consensus, not without dissent,50 that the culprit in this developing legal
crisis is a particular type of non-practicing entity—the kind of NPE that specializes in patent
assertion. A non-practicing entity is a person (legal or human) that seeks to enforce patent rights
it is not exercising as part of research or production processes. Thus, the status of the patent
holder as “non-practicing” is defined by reference to what the holder does. If the patent in
question is not being practiced, the holder is a non-practicing entity with respect to the rights at
issue. This is true even if the holder might be regarded as a practicing entity with respect to
other patents.
There are different types of NPEs,51 and while some stir great objections, others escape
opprobrium.52 Inventors,53 educational institutions, and businesses that produce other goods and

Cf. Colleen V. Chien, Reforming Software Patents, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 325, 326 (2012) (“[H]istory teaches away
from broad based legislative reform and towards narrowly tailored incremental reform with lessons for today.”).
50
See Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 30, at 427-28 (“[T]he debate should focus on the merits of the lawsuits or the
actions of the parties in the litigation, or both, and not on the parties’ identities.”) (emphasis omitted).
51
Chien, supra note 49, at 351 (“Trolls also come in different types. Although all of them . . . use patents primarily
for litigation and licensing rather than to support technology transfer and commercialization, they do so in different
ways.”).
52
See Cascades Computer Innovation LLC v. RPX Corp., No. 12-CV-01143 YGR, 2013 WL 316023, at *1 n.3
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2013) (“Not all NPEs are referred to as ‘patent trolls.’ For example, research universities may
develop patented technology but not practice the patents”).
53
Nguyen, supra note 48, at 105 (“[A] significant difference between the licensing inventor and the patent troll . . .
[is] intent to bring the patent to market.”).
49

8

services are all NPEs when they assert patent rights that they hold but do not practice. Yet these
persons are usually not condemned as trolls.54
A clear taxonomy of NPEs would be useful, but in truth, writers employ a range of
terminology.55 Thus, while there is some degree of agreement as to the relevant types of NPEs,
the labels for those categories vary.56
Some NPEs produce essentially no products or services, except in connection with the
buying and selling of patent rights and related litigation. What is distinctive about these NPEs is
that they specialize in patent assertion. This is their primary line of endeavor. Their “only
business . . . is to monetize their patents.”57 It is this type of NPE that is widely criticized by
scholars, legislators, practicing lawyers, and news reporters.58 This is the category of NPE that
Mark A. Lemley and A. Douglas Melamed had in mind when they described patent trolls as
“patent owners whose primary business is collecting money from others that allegedly infringe
their patents.”59 This variety of NPE might have been called a “Specialized NPE” (to distinguish
it from NPEs that do not specialize in patent assertion) or a “Primary NPE” (to indicate that
patent assertion is its primary business). However, most authorities simply call the persons in
this category “NPEs,” even though there are other kinds of NPEs.60 Thus, the NPE label belongs
to this subcategory (specialized NPEs) in the same way that, in common usage, the term
Cf. Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 30, at 453-54 (“Congress is currently considering . . . the Saving High-tech
Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes, or ’SHIELD,’ Act . . . [which is] is intended to cover only patent trolls
. . . [and] excludes from its reach practicing entities, individual inventors, and universities.”).
55
See Fusco, supra note 6, at 443 (“Within the context of patent law, scholars, practitioners and policy makers have
offered several definitions of ‘NPE.’”); Carter, supra note 9, at 30 (discussing “inside patent trolls, heat seeking
patent trolls, and trolling patent trolls”); see also Helmers & McDonagh, supra note 15, at 2 (“no single definition of
‘PAE’ [patent assertion entity]”).
56
See Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 30, at 429 (“[T]here is no uniformly accepted definition of who is an NPE or
patent troll.”).
57
Lemley & Melamed, supra note 20, at 2129.
58
See Helmers & McDonagh, supra note 15, at 2 (“unprecedented media scrutiny”).
59
Lemley & Melamed, supra note 20, at 2118 (emphasis added).
60
See, e.g., Fusco, supra note 6, at 443 (restricting her definition of “NPE” to exclude “universities or other research
institutions that . . . could also be considered NPEs”).
54
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“American” refers to the United States, even though there are other countries in North, Central,
and South America.
When there is reason to refer to other kinds of NPEs—inventors,61 educational
institutions, and producers of other goods and services—that do not specialize in patent
assertion, the relevant facts will be clearly pointed out. Companies that produce products
sometimes have an “inside” patent troll62 whose job it is to enforce the company’s non-practiced
patents against competitors.63 This type of infringement vigilance is more likely to be viewed as
legitimate competition than as an abuse of the legal system, even though a 2006 study showed
that one-sixth of all European patents are used “to ‘block’ competitors from engaging in research
surrounding the protected patent.”64 Some scholars argue that “patent assertions by practicing
entities can create just as many problems as assertions by patent trolls.”65
Occasionally, writers refer to NPEs as “pure NPEs”66 in an effort to point out that these
entities specialize in patent assertion. However, this label seems too gentle. Specialized NPEs
often employ aggressive67 or opportunistic68 tactics. In addition to deception,69 these tactics
sometimes include: “threatening to sue thousands of companies at once, without specific
61

See LML Holdings, Inc. v. Pac. Coast Distrib. Inc., No. 11–CV–06173, 2012 WL 2994017, *1 n.2 (N.D. Cal. July
20, 2012) (“the classic definition of a non-practicing entity, or patent troll, does not envision an entity which the
patent inventors themselves wholly own.”).
62
See Carter, supra note 9, at 30-31 (differentiating between inside patent trolls, heat seeking patent trolls, and
trolling patent trolls and explaining that defensive strategies should vary according to the nature of the troll).
63
See Helmers & McDonagh, supra note 15, at 6 (describing a producing entity’s use of a patent assertion entity “to
attack the producing companies’ direct competitors . . . .”).
64
See Helmers & McDonagh, supra note 15, at 3.
65
Lemley & Melamed, supra note 20, at 2120; see also id. at 2137-38 (discussing “patent privateers—productproducing companies that spin off patents or ally with trolls to target other firms with lawsuits”).
66
See, e.g., Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 30, at 454.
67
See, e.g., Overstock.com, Inc. v. Furnace Brook, LLC, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1218 (D. Utah 2005), aff’d 191 F.
App’x 959 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (discussing intimidation tactics used by alleged patent troll).
68
See Chrimar Sys., Inc. v. Foundry Networks, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 2d 918, 926 (E.D. Mich. 2013) (“opportunistic”).
69
See Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 706 F. Supp. 2d 713, 727 n.5 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (“Allcare
used a survey with a stated purpose of identifying leaders in the medical-information-processing industry as a ruse to
identify potential targets for licensing demands . . . and . . . engaged in questionable and, at times, deceitful
conduct.”).

10

evidence of infringement against any of them; creating shell companies that make it difficult for
defendants to know who is suing them; and asserting that their patents cover inventions not
imagined at the time they were granted.”70
Some NPEs are large enterprises.71 However, others are “small operations whose only
apparent asset is a patent and whose only apparent business is sending demand letters to potential
infringers in order to secure licensing fees.”72 “NPEs acquire their patents from many sources,
including small companies, large companies, bankrupt companies, start-ups, solo inventors,
hospitals, universities and even the government.”73
NPEs argue that they play an important role in “level[ing] the playing field between
individual inventors and large multinational corporations with vast resources, by providing
financial and other assistance to make patent licensing or litigation a more equal contest.”74
However, well-informed critics respond that “there is no evidence . . . to support the common
assertions from patent lawyers that NPEs help small inventors.”75 Thus, “recent scholarship
pours scorn on the supposed ‘positive’ effects of PAE activities.”76
According to critics, NPEs are simply dedicated to extracting rent from producers based
on alleged infringement of their patent rights.77 It is argued that NPEs contribute little to the

70

Assemb. 2462, 216th Leg., 1st Ann. Sess. § 1(b) (N.J. 2014).
See Ewing & Feldman, supra note 4, at 15 (discussing a mass aggregator).
72
Overstock.com, 420 F. Supp. 2d at 1222; see also InternetAd Sys., LLC v. Opodo Ltd., 481 F. Supp. 2d 596, 601
(N.D. Tex. 2007) (discussing the term “patent troll”); see also Nguyen, supra note 48, at 106 (discussing an NPE
run out of a lawyer’s home that produces nothing).
73
Fusco, supra note 6, at 443–44.
74
Cascades Computer Innovation LLC v. RPX Corp., No. 12-CV-01143 YGR, 2013 WL 316023, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 24, 2013); see also Carter, supra note 9, at 30 (noting that patent trolls can “enhance the ability of inventors to
police their patents”).
75
Bessen & Meurer, supra note 24, at 412 (emphasis added); see also Lemley & Melamed, supra note 20, at 2125
(“[T]here is little evidence that trolls significantly increase rewards to inventors.”).
76
See Helmers & McDonagh, supra note 15, at 6.
77
Cf. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“An industry . . . primarily
for obtaining licensing fees”).
71
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welfare of society,78 but instead benefit at the expense of both producers and the persons who use
their products.79 It was to this type of entity that a New Jersey state legislator was referring
when he asserted that “[p]atent trolls offer no economic value and stand counter to the spirit of
American ingenuity and threaten the vitality of our innovation-based economy.”80

IV.

WHY PATENT TROLLING OCCURS
Many factors contribute to the effectiveness of the various NPE business models.81 As

suggested above, threats of infringement litigation are made more credible and potent by the
current legal rules that treat patents as presumptively valid and impose strict liability for
infringement. The same is true of the systemic realities that generally ensure that patent
litigation is prolonged, complex and exceedingly expensive. “Troll behavior . . . is fueled by a
patent system that lacks a cost-effective method of quickly resolving validity and infringement
questions.”82
Four factors that have contributed to the growth of patent trolling bear special mention:
(1) lax granting practices; (2) obstacles to evaluating claims; (3) uncertainties related to
injunctive relief; and (4) antitrust restraints on anti-trolling collective action.

78

See Christopher A. Cotropia, The Individual Inventor Motif in the Age of the Patent Troll, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH.
52, 62 (2009–10) (“Patent trolls tax innovation by extracting licensing revenue without giving back anything in
return.”).
79
See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 20, at 2124 (“There is widespread belief that trolls impose greater costs on
technology users and society as a whole . . . and that they provide little social benefit . . . . Other reports suggest that
patent trolls inhibit innovation at the firms they sue.”).
80
See Booth, supra note 13 (quoting New Jersey Assemblyman Troy Singleton) (internal quotation marks omitted).
81
See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 20, at 2126-27 (differentiating between the methods of “lottery-ticket” trolls,
“bottom-feeder” trolls, and “patent aggregators”).
82
Ewing & Feldman, supra note 4, at 41.
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A. Lax Granting Practices
In many instances, the practices that lead to the granting of patents are devoid of rigor.83
For example, the United States Patent and Trademark Office “has been notoriously lax in
granting patents on even small advances in the [IT] industry.”84 This means that not only is the
validity of patents often doubtful, but there is an almost endless supply of dubious patents for
NPEs to acquire and assert.85 Moreover, vague patents increase the uncertainties for targets
defending infringement claims and make it more likely that they will settle with NPEs regardless
of the merits.86

B. Obstacles to Evaluation of Claims
The vagueness of many patents87 enables NPEs to assert claims of infringement that are
difficult for targets to evaluate or disprove.88 This is particularly true of business methods
patents,89 which are notoriously vague, as well as software patents, which pose their own special
problems.90 Overly broad patents are particularly valuable to NPEs because they allow NPEs “to
cast a wider net when threatening potentially infringing industries.”91

83

BAINBRIDGE, supra note 5, at 397.
Lemley & Melamed, supra note 20, at 2148.
85
See Ewing & Feldman, supra note 4, at 41 (“A copious supply of patents that are only lightly tested at the time of
the grant enhances the problem.”); Magliocca, supra note 8, at 1826-27 (explaining that patent examiners are a
“traditional scapegoat” and that “anti-troll forces . . . [claim] that the Patent Office issues far too many low quality
patents.”).
86
See Magliocca, supra note 8, at 1827 (“A defendant in an infringement suit based on an unclear patent . . . faces
even more risk of defeat.”).
87
See Helmers & McDonagh, supra note 15, at 6 (patents that cover software and business methods “have been
shown to often have fuzzy boundaries”).
88
Ewing & Feldman, supra note 4, at 24 (“Given the difficulty of translating the abstract language of a patent from
one context to another, the lack of predictability in patent decisions, and other uncertainties in patent law, it is
difficult to tell whether a particular patent claim will be upheld and whether a particular product will be found to
infringe a given claim.”).
89
See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 5, at 398 (business methods patents are often “vague and of suspect validity”).
90
See Scott Graham, Federal Circuit Puts Added Squeeze on Software Patents, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 14, 2014 (opining
that “the universe of eligible software patents clearly is shrinking” in the U.S.); see also Assemb. 2462, 216th Leg.,
1st Ann. Sess. § 1I (N.J. 2014) (declaring that Patent Assertion Entities “take advantage of uncertainty about the
scope or validity of patent claims, especially in software-related patents because of the relative novelty of the
84
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The problems posed by vagueness and over-breadth are compounded by the obstacles to
investigation. “[N]o simple search can ensure that a technology is not already patented,”92 and
“it is easy to overlook a dormant patent.”93 Thus, even diligent efforts to ensure compliance with
the law may be frustrated by systemic complexity. In many cases, there are simply too many
patents94 and too many variables that must be taken into account.95 In some fast-moving fields,
backlogged patent applications make it impossible to do a complete search. In the IT industry,
for example, “firms commonly invent technologies that are claimed by previously filed patent
applications that have not yet resulted in issued patents and often have not yet even been
published.”96
The evaluation of infringement claims becomes even more difficult when patent
aggregators allege that a target has infringed multiple patents. 97 In that case, to avoid buying a
license, a target must be able to confidently predict that it will not be held liable for infringing
any of the patents at issue.

technology and because it has been difficult to separate the ‘function’ of the software from the ‘means’ by which
that function is accomplished”).
91
Mayergoyz, supra note 2, at 246.
92
Magliocca, supra note 8, at 1815.
93
Id. at 1817.
94
See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 20, at 2148 (“too many patents in the IT space”); id. at 2149 (noting the
“endless parade of patents granted on every new idea”).
95
Ewing & Feldman, supra note 4, at 24 (“With the millions of active patents on record, each of which may have
dozens or even hundreds of claims, combined with the difficulty of knowing how they will be interpreted, it is
impossible to know with certainty that one’s product will not infringe someone else’s patent claims.”).
96
Lemley & Melamed, supra note 20, at 2148; id. (“Simultaneous invention and inadvertent infringement are . . .
ubiquitous.”).
97
See id. at 2153 (“[T]he aggregation of large numbers of patents in the hands of a single entity overwhelms alleged
infringers.”).
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C. The Uncertain Right to Injunctive Relief
Prior to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C.,98 many assumed that patent holders were normally entitled to injunctive relief in cases of
infringement. This fact placed NPEs in a strong position to sell technology licenses to producers
of allegedly infringing products. The risk of an adverse finding in litigation meant not merely
liability for damages, but the likely issuance of a court order that would close down an entire
product line until it could be re-designed to avoid the patented technology.99 Ultimately, the
Supreme Court held:
[T]he decision whether to grant or deny injunctive relief rests within the
equitable discretion of the district courts, and that such discretion must be
exercised consistent with traditional principles of equity, in patent
disputes no less than in other cases governed by such standards.100
The eBay ruling weakened the hand of NPEs, but it did not decisively strengthen the hand
of targets. Under the usual four-part test for injunctive relief,101 considerable uncertainty
remains as to whether an injunction will be granted if an NPE prevails in litigation. Since eBay,
more requests for injunctive relief have been granted than denied, but only about 26% of requests
for injunctive relief by NPEs have been granted.102
The important point is that few producers of goods and services can afford to assume the
substantial risk that an entire product line will be shut down if a court, after considering a four98

eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
See id. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[T]he potentially serious sanctions arising from its violation can be
employed as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy licenses to practice the
patent.”).
100
Id. at 394.
101
Id. at 391 (“A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available
at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of
hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would
not be disserved by a permanent injunction.”).
102
See Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public Interest, STANFORD PUBLIC
LAW WORKING PAPER NO. 2022168 (July 2, 2012), fig. 1, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2022168.
99
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part test and a multitude of relevant facts, decides to grant injunctive relief.103 This risk is quite
real,104 and like other litigation risks, it “correlates to an increase in the defendant’s willingness
to settle.”105 Thus, the uncertainty of injunctive relief still makes an important contribution to
the effectiveness of NPE business models.

D. Antitrust Restraints
The best answer to trolling by NPEs might be self-help on the part of targets who could
“better use industry organizations and collective action”106 to defend their own interests. Since
claims of infringement are often made by NPEs against hundreds of companies, those targets
can, and sometimes do, band together to share information107 and otherwise resist NPE pressures
to purchase unwanted licenses. This is precisely what the makers of phones and tablets using the
Android operating system did to protect their interests by means of an entity called RPX. As
explained by a United States district court,
RPX itself is an NPE, but . . . it is a defensive patent aggregator or “antitroll,” formed to protect its members from NPEs, like Plaintiff, who file
infringement claims. RPX frequently acts as an intermediary for its
members for purposes of acquiring patents and negotiating licenses on
behalf of its more than 110 members. According to the Complaint, RPX
effectively discourages its members from dealing independently with
patent owners. RPX believes that by making individual inventors, patent

See Magliocca, supra note 8, at 1814 (noting that patent infringement plaintiffs can “shut down production of an
entire product line, which gives them powerful leverage in settlement negotiations”).
104
But see Lemley & Melamed, supra note 20, at 2142 (claiming that, after eBay, trolls rarely are able to “use the
threat of injunctions to extract favourable settlements from alleged infringers” because “they almost never satisfy the
eBay criteria”).
105
Nguyen, supra note 48, at 120; see also Helmers & McDonagh, supra note 15, at 5 (“the mere possibility . . .
[that an injunction may be granted] may encourage the producing company to enter into a licence agreement . . . .”).
106
Chien, supra note 49, at 326.
107
See Fusco, supra note 6, at 450 (discussing “PatentFreedom, an organization that gathers and analyzes data about
NPE activity, and provides that data to its subscribers” in Europe (footnote omitted)).
103
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owners and NPEs negotiate through RPX, its members are able to
acquire patent rights at “wholesale” royalty rates.108
Such types of collective action must not run afoul of applicable antitrust laws. Trolling
targets with monopsony109 power have been sued for violation of United States federal laws and
forced to defend their conduct.110 Even if there has been no violation of antitrust restrictions,
defending against such allegations is expensive. Such ancillary litigation adds another layer of
legal complexity to the struggle to deal with NPE infringement claims. The risk of antitrust
liability makes collective self-help by targets less probable. To that extent, trolling claims are
more likely to succeed.

V.

OBSTACLES TO A SOLUTION
A. Lack of Empirical Information
One of the greatest obstacles to minimizing the costs of patent trolling is the lack of

relevant empirical information, both in the United States and in Europe.111 While intuition and
opinion abound, facts are in short supply. 112 The absence of reliable facts impedes reform
efforts, and that in turn permits NPE patent assertions to grow at an alarming pace.113

108

Cascades Computer Innovation LLC v. RPX Corp., No. 12-CV-01143 YGR, 2013 WL 316023, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 24, 2013) (citations omitted).
109
“Monopsony” is “[a] market situation in which one buyer controls the market.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th
ed. 2009).
110
See Cascades, 2013 WL 316023, at *1 (dismissing federal antitrust claims but granting the plaintiff leave to
amend).
111
See Helmers, supra note note 1, at 513 (noting “[t]he lack of data on Europe’s experience with trolls”); id. at 515
(“[R]elevant empirical evidence is in short supply.”).
112
See id. at 546 (“Comparisons of the European and American experiences with NPEs have so far been long on
anecdote and short on data”).
113
See Ewing & Feldman, supra note 4, at 41 (“As long as insufficient information, uncertainty, and high
transaction costs reign, troll activity will continue to flourish.”).
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There is “little evidence on the overall economic impact” of NPE litigation.114 More
fundamentally, “[e]ven the question of whether NPE activity is in fact harming innovation has
not been conclusively answered.”115 According to Professor Gerard N. Magliocca, “[t]he only
thing that both sides might agree upon is that there is no real evidence about the impact that trolls
are having on technology investment, which makes drawing policy conclusions in this area
especially hazardous.”116 Thus, it has been argued that policy makers “need better data on the
merits of NPE patent cases, settlement amounts in those cases, the length of time NPE cases last,
and the amount of attorneys’ fees paid by defendants and NPEs to get a true picture of what the
reality is.”117
Patent trolling is seemingly much less of a problem in Europe than in the United
States.118 However, it is difficult to explain the cause of this disparity. A recent article identified
seven differences between the American and European legal systems that might explain why
infringement claims by non-practicing entities are so much more common in the United States,
including: (1) the greater availability of injunctive relief; (2) higher damage awards in American
courts; (3) the absence of a single jurisdiction for patent litigation in Europe;119 (4) more readily
available funding for NPE activity in the United States; (5) difficulties of obtaining business
methods and financial methods patents in Europe; (6) general differences related to culture; and
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See Helmers & McDonagh, supra note 15, at 7.
See Fusco, supra note 6, at 440.
116
Magliocca, supra note 8, at 1810-11.
117
Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 30, at 449.
118
See Fusco, supra note 6, at 442 (“Patent trolls are, in fact, active in European countries—albeit at a lower level . .
. .”).
119
But cf. Helmers, supra note 1, at 514 (footnote omitted) (“In 2013, twenty-five EU member nations (including the
U.K.) agreed to found a Unified Patent Court. If ultimately implemented, the court will allow some European patent
owners—those who hold a ‘unitary patent’—to litigate continent-wide infringement allegations in a single court
rather than seeking redress in each individual country . . . .”).
115
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(7) “the size of the targeted market.”120 Still, Professor Stefania Fusco, the author of the study,
concluded that “much more investigation is necessary” before it can be said that the United
States should adopt reforms to make its law or legal system more similar to Europe’s,121 such as
by enacting fee-shifting rules.122 Fusco found that rather than offering compelling evidence of
the key role of legal differences, “[t]he data suggests that markets with high revenue producing
companies operating in certain industries [is what] attract[s] trolls.”123

B. Vested Interests and Political Inertia
Two other obstacles to minimizing the costs of patent trolling through legal reform are
vested interests and inertia. “[A]ny proposal affecting substantive rights is a nonstarter because
most patentees are not susceptible to holdups”124 by NPEs. Therefore, many persons with vested
interests in the patent system are unwilling to consider fundamental changes to a regime from
which they currently benefit.
In addition, significant changes to United States patent law are unlikely to occur because
of the politics in Washington, D.C.125 For a long time now, the two major parties have been
unwilling to work together to effectively tackle a whole range of important issues. Moreover, it
is rarely the case that the two houses of Congress and the presidency are controlled by the same
party and animated by the same vision. John Holub, the president of the New Jersey Retail
Merchants Association, a lobbying group, was reported as stating that “the odds of getting
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See Fusco, supra note 6, at 453-58.
See id. at 440.
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But see Helmers, supra note 1, at 516 (“Our findings tend to suggest, instead, that attorney’s fee awards are a key
factor in the scarcity of NPE activities in Europe”).
123
See Fusco, supra note 6, at 461.
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Magliocca, supra note 8, at 1834.
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See Mayergoyz, supra note 2, at 253-54 (discussing attempted federal legislative reforms).
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anything through Congress currently are ‘slim and none.’”126 But perhaps the situation is not
that bleak. The America Invents Act of 2011127 made a minor change related to trolling by
ending the practice that allowed NPEs to join unrelated defendants in the same suit.128 However,
it may be the case that legislative solutions are more likely to come from state capitols than from
Washington, D.C.
The unwillingness of vested interests to change the current rules of patent law is
reinforced by vague hopes that the system will naturally right itself.129 For example, it is
possible that the recent emergence of the patent mass aggregators—what some have described as
“an entirely different beast”130—might reduce the costs of trolling if such entities buy up patents
that might otherwise be acquired by traditional NPEs as fodder for infringement claims. This
kind of “anti-troll activity may explain why some of the largest market incumbent technology
companies are listed as early investors and participants in mass aggregators.”131 However, at this
early juncture, it is still unclear whether the mass aggregators, which often operate with the
utmost secrecy, will mitigate or exacerbate the costs of trolling. Professor Robin Feldman and
Tom Ewing warn that the mass aggregation of patent rights has its own risks, and that the
dangers posed by such new entities—which often use hundreds of shell entities and acquire
thousands of patents—may outweigh the benefits.132
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Booth, supra note 13 (quoting Holub).
LEAHY-SMITH AMERICA INVENTS ACT, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified in scattered sections
of 35 U.S.C.).
128
See Tracie L. Bryant, The America Invents Act: Slaying Trolls, Limiting Joinder, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 687, 689
(2012) (“[D]efendants can only be joined if (1) the parties are alleged to be jointly or severally liable or the
defendants’ alleged infringements arose out of the same transaction or occurrence, and (2) there are common
questions of fact.”).
129
Cf. Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 183, 184 (2004) (discussing “a
partial self-correcting impulse in the IP system”).
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Ewing & Feldman, supra note 4, at 1.
131
Id. at 23.
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Id.
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VI.

REDUCING COSTS THROUGH SUNSHINE
As presently configured, patent law allows NPEs—persons with no particular interest in

scientific discovery or invention—to benefit from rules that were intended to spur scientific
advancement in the useful arts and the development of innovative technology.133 It is
particularly frustrating that NPEs seem to enjoy an unmerited windfall, but also operate with so
little transparency that it is difficult for targets and policy makers to chart an intelligent course in
response to NPE infringement allegations.
“In order for companies . . . to be able to respond promptly and efficiently to patent
infringement assertions against them, it is necessary that they receive specific information
regarding how their product, service, or technology may have infringed the patent at issue . . .
.”134 However, informational deficiencies sometimes include such basic facts as the real identity
of the patent owner,135 the challenges that have been raised to the validity of the patent in
question, and the identities of the persons to whom the technology has already been licensed.136
Targets often lack information about the NPE’s business methods and history of success or
failure in asserting the patent. Because of confidentiality provisions used in licensing
transactions,137 relevant information may be virtually impossible to obtain.138 These problems
exist in both the United States and abroad. Thus, Professors Christian Helmers, Brian Love, and
Luke McDonagh, in their discussion of trolling in the United Kingdom, have noted that NPEs
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts by securing for limited Times, to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries”).
134
Assemb. 2462, 216th Leg. 1st Ann. Sess. § 1(g) (N.J. 2014).
135
See Carter, supra note 9, at 30-31 (discussing trolls that “hide their true identities” and strategies for gathering
information).
136
This last factor bears on the value of a license. See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 20, at 2137 (“[T]he amount a
buyer will pay for a patent depends in part on the extent to which the patent is licensed to others.”).
137
Cf. Ewing & Feldman, supra note 4, at 3 (“[L]icensing transactions and interactions are protected by strict
nondisclosure agreements . . . .”).
138
Id. at 3-5 (discussing patent mass aggregators).
133
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have a tactical advantage because they “can and do obscure patent ownership before filing
suit.”139
Of course, these kinds of obstacles are not insurmountable. Legal systems often create
disclosure obligations and impose liability for failure to comply. The following sections
consider how the legal system might be restructured to reduce the costs of trolling by exposing
NPE practices to “sunshine.” The first section deals with civil liability for nondisclosure of
material information. The second section considers how a registration and reporting regime for
NPEs might be established.

A. Civil Liability for Deceptive Nondisclosure
Theoretically, the costs associated with trolling might be reduced if NPEs were held
responsible for frivolous litigation. However, to date, such sanctions typically have not been
effective. A lawyer specializing in United States intellectual property law recently opined,
“[p]atent trolls who bring frivolous claims are rarely punished and their numbers are on the
rise.”140 As presently configured, the law governing tort actions in the United States for damages
and judicial sanctions for frivolous litigation does little to deter or redress patent trolling.
However, legislative changes could create more effective sanctions to better address these issues.
1. Tort Actions for Damages
Tort actions that are designed to redress misuse of the legal system generally require
proof that legal proceedings have terminated in favor of the party seeking redress and impose

139
140

Helmers, supra note 1, at 543.
Carter, supra note 9, at 30.
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other formidable requirements. This is true in both the United States141 and Britain.142 However,
in most patent trolling disputes, litigation is never filed by the troll, let alone resolved in favor of
the target. Moreover, when suits are filed, they are usually resolved by agreement. One study of
138 patent suits filed in the United States by NPEs found that “roughly 90%” settled.143
Typically, the target of the infringement claim purchases an unwanted license to avoid the costs
and risks of litigation. This type of settlement precludes any ruling on the merits in the
underlying dispute. Focused on getting back to business, a target that purchased a license is
unlikely to initiate subsequent ancillary litigation to prove that it can recover for losses related to
the now-resolved infringement claim. Any such claim would encounter serious obstacles.
Under the terms of the settlement of the underlying matter, the target is likely to have
relinquished its rights to seek judicial redress. In addition, legal rules typically protect persons
(presumably including NPEs) from tort liability related to the bona fide exercise or assertion of
legal rights. Such actions are normally immunized from liability by absolute or qualified
privileges.144
2. Frivolous Litigation Sanctions
Judges often have the power to impose sanctions on parties that engage in frivolous
litigation. United States patent law provides that a “court in exceptional cases may award
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 674 (1977) (“One who takes an active part in the initiation,
continuation or procurement of civil proceedings against another is subject to liability to the other for wrongful civil
proceedings if
(a) he acts without probable cause, and primarily for a purpose other than that of securing the proper adjudication of
the claim in which the proceedings are based, and (b) except when they are ex parte, the proceedings have
terminated in favor of the person against whom they are brought.” (emphasis added)).
142
See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 5, at 559 (In the United Kingdom, “entitlement to relief [in a groundless threats
action] is subject to the claimant showing that the patent is invalid in a relevant respect and, even then, relief is not
available if the defendant shows that, at the time of making the threats [of infringement proceedings], he did not
know and had no reason to suspect that the patent was invalid in that respect. . . .”).
143
Helmers, supra note 1, at 545.
144
See, e.g., Tex. Beef Cattle Co. v. Green, 921 S.W.2d 203, 211 (Tex. 1996) (recognizing an unqualified privilege
to exercise a legal right and a qualified privilege to assert a colorable legal right in good faith).
141
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reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”145 In addition, under Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure,146 a court may impose sanctions if a “complaint is ‘legally or factually
“baseless” from an objective perspective’ and . . . the attorney failed to conduct a ‘reasonable
and competent inquiry’ before filing the complaint.”147 Still, these types of penalties do not play
any role in the vast majority of trolling disputes where litigation is never filed.148 In such cases,
there is nothing pending before a court that could be the object of judicial scrutiny.
If a patent infringement action has been filed, courts sometimes award sanctions under
the above-mentioned provisions.149 In one notable ruling arising from an infringement suit filed
by an NPE, the Federal Circuit affirmed an award against the NPE for “$489,150.48 in attorney
fees and costs pursuant to § 285 and $141,984.70 in sanctions for . . . violation of Rule 11.”150 In
explaining its ruling, the court wrote in relevant part:
Eon-Net argues that it is not improper for a patentee to vigorously
enforce its patent rights or offer standard licensing terms, and Eon–Net is
correct. But the appetite for licensing revenue cannot overpower a
litigant’s and its counsel’s obligation to file cases reasonably based in
law and fact and to litigate those cases in good faith. Here, the district
court did not clearly err when it found that Eon-Net filed an objectively
baseless infringement action against Flagstar and brought that action in
bad faith, specifically to extract a nuisance value settlement by exploiting
the high cost imposed on Flagstar to defend against Eon-Net’s baseless
claims. It also appears that in filing this case, Zimmerman merely
145

35 U.S.C.A. § 285 (2014).
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (2014).
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Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, 653 F.3d 1314, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
148
See, e.g., Chien, supra note 49, at 382 (“According to one account, troll E-Data Corporation sued forty-three
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149
See, e.g., Colida v. Sanyo N. Am. Corp., No. 04-1287, 2004 WL 2853034, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 2, 2004)
(limiting the award to “double costs” and declining to award attorneys’ fees). But see Chrimar Sys., Inc. v. Foundry
Networks, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 2d 918, 927 (E.D. Mich. 2013) (declining to assess attorney’s fees against an alleged
“patent troll”); see also Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1749 (2014) (holding
that “an appellate court should apply an abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing all aspects of a district court’s
determination” that a patent infringement case is exceptional and warrants an award of attorney’s fees to the
prevailing party).
150
Eon-Net, 653 F.3d at 1317.
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followed the direction of his client, Medina, who Zimmerman
characterized at oral argument as “difficult to control.” . . . . But an
attorney, in addition to his obligation to his client, also has an obligation
to the court and should not blindly follow the client’s interests if not
supported by law and facts. In these circumstances, coupled with the
district court’s supported findings regarding Eon-Net’s litigation
misconduct, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in its
exceptional case finding . . . .
. . . . Eon-Net has [also] failed to meet its high burden to show that the
district court abused its discretion in imposing Rule 11 sanctions. 151
However, judges are “mindful of the possibility that awarding damages and costs could
have an undue chilling effect on the behavior of later litigants.”152 Thus, many judges are
reluctant to award costs or expenses to a target that defeats an infringement claim. This is true
even in cases of alleged patent trolling.153 “[I]n the U.S., . . . patentees who fail to prove their
claims only wind up paying their opponents’ attorney’s fees about two percent of the time.”154
Interestingly, the fact that other targets of trolling purchased licenses from an NPE is
sometimes regarded as a reason why a target who declines a license and prevails in litigation
should be denied compensation for the attorney’s fees incurred in fighting the infringement
claim.155 The other licenses are treated as evidence of the plausibility of the NPE’s allegations of
infringement. This line of reasoning is suspect because the targets that purchased licenses may
have done so for reasons entirely unrelated to the merits of the infringement claims against them.
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3. A New Cause of Action
Mindful of the fact that the ordinary rules of tort law, patent law, and civil procedure do
little to deter and penalize patent trolling, American lawmakers have begun to craft legislation
that would make it easier for judges to hold patent trolls accountable for abusive practices. For
example, in New Jersey, a committee of the state General Assembly has unanimously
recommended passage of a bill that would allow a court to award a wide range of relief to a party
that is the victim of a bad faith assertion of patent infringement. That bill articulates a list of
considerations that a court could take into account in determining whether the holder of patent
rights acted in bad faith. According to the bill:
A court may consider the following factors as evidence that a person has
made a bad faith assertion of patent infringement:
(1) The demand letter does not contain the following information: (a) the
patent number; (b) the name and address of the patent owner or owners and
assignee or assignees, if any; and (c) factual allegations concerning the
specific areas in which the target’s products, services, and technology
infringe the patent or are covered by the claims in the patent.
(2) Prior to sending the demand letter, the person fails to conduct an
analysis comparing the claims in the patent to the target’s products, services,
and technology, or such an analysis was done but does not identify specific
areas in which the products, services, and technology are covered by the
claims in the patent.
(3) The demand letter lacks the information described in this subsection,
the target requests the information, and the person fails to provide the
information within a reasonable period of time.
(4) The demand letter demands payment of a license fee or response
within an unreasonably short period of time.
(5) The person offers to license the patent for an amount that is not based
on a reasonable estimate of the value of the license.
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(6) The claim or assertion of patent infringement is meritless, and the
person knew, or should have known, that the claim or assertion is meritless.
(7) The claim or assertion of patent infringement is deceptive.
(8) The person or its subsidiaries or affiliates have previously filed or
threatened to file one or more lawsuits based on the same or similar claim of
patent infringement and: (a) those threats or lawsuits lacked the information
described in this subsection; or (b) the person attempted to enforce the claim
of patent infringement in litigation and a court found the claim to be
meritless.
(9) Any other factor the court finds relevant.156
The bill also contains a list of factors that may be considered evidence that patent
infringement was not asserted in bad faith. Some of those considerations include the patent
assertion entity’s status as an inventor of the patent,157 an institution of higher education,158 or a
person who made a “substantial investment in the use of the patent or in the production or sale of
a product or items covered by the patent.”159 These provisions tend to protect from liability
NPEs who do not specialize in asserting patent claims.
Importantly, the New Jersey bill would provide remedies to trolling targets regardless of
whether litigation was filed against them. Those remedies include: “(1) equitable relief; (2)
damages; (3) costs and fees, including reasonable attorney’s fees; and (4) exemplary damages in
an amount equal to $50,000 or three times the total of damages, costs, and fees, whichever is
greater.”160 Thus, the proposed law would greatly expand the liability of NPEs for damages and
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attorney’s fees,161 as well as enhance the power of the courts to sanction frivolous patent
infringement allegations.
Such legislation would make an important contribution toward deterring abusive trolling
practices. The legislation would be particularly useful in addressing the weakest claims of patent
infringement. Those are the claims that an NPE is least likely to pursue through litigation162 and
thus are beyond the reach of traditional tort remedies and frivolous litigation sanctions. In
contrast, the New Jersey bill broadly defines “targets” to include not only those who have been
sued for infringement, but also those who have received a demand for payment that has been
made in writing.163 The bill allows all such targets to commence an action in state Superior
Court seeking the full range of remedies that the law provides.164
The New Jersey bill would create a new cause of action under state law. The rigid
requirements of a traditional cause of action for misuse of legal procedures would be replaced by
a flexible inquiry into whether or not an NPE acted in bad faith. Under this new cause of action,
it would not be essential for the target to prove that the NPE acted without probable cause or that
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infringement litigation terminated in favor of the target.165 Instead, whether the infringement
claim had merit would be only one of many factors that a court could take into account.
A cause of action framed in terms of good faith is appropriate because, according to
numerous patent-trolling critics, many NPEs act irresponsibly by asserting rights under patents
that are of dubious validity or applicability. This “apparent indifference to patent quality has . . .
spurred criticism of trolls, particularly the patent aggregators.”166 In other words, many NPEs
are perceived to be acting in bad faith.
By focusing judicial attention on whether particular information has been disclosed, the
new cause of action would be akin to common law and statutory causes of action that impose tort
liability for misrepresentation.167 Unlike other anti-trolling legislative proposals, the New Jersey
bill is not limited to redressing problems in select sectors of the economy, such as computer
hardware and software.168 Moreover, the bill would create both a path to civil liability and
incentives for NPEs to disclose information that would assist targets in evaluating the merits of
infringement claims and in deciding whether169 and how to respond.
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B. Registration and Reporting Requirements
Civil liability for nondisclosure of information pertinent to infringement claims could be
supplemented by a mandatory registration and reporting regime for NPEs similar to the
obligations now imposed on lobbyists by United States federal law,170 many state laws171 and
some major municipal laws.172 The goals of such a regime would be to force large NPEs to
operate more transparently. This would enable policy makers and scholars to more effectively
scrutinize the operation of such entities.173 It would also assist the targets of trolling in
responding to infringement allegations. At present, “laws provide limited opportunities for
identifying and tracking activity in . . . [the patent monetization] market and many opportunities
for hiding [it].”174 Yet scholars argue that “it is important to learn and understand as much as
possible about the way NPEs function.”175
The structure of a registration and reporting regime would be dictated by the answers to
three key questions: who must register, what must be reported, and how compliance will be
enforced. Inasmuch as there are no NPE reporting regimes now in place that could be used as
sources of guidance as to what is politically feasible and useful, legislators will need to exercise
good judgment in answering the above questions.
1. Who Must Register?
It is useful to remember that when a reporting regime imposes obligations too broadly,
the regime is both difficult to enact and controversial in operation. Moreover, an excessively
170
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broad reporting scheme may produce so much information that it does little to clarify public
understanding of a problem. Consequently, for practical reasons, minor NPEs should be
exempted from registration and reporting. Whether an NPE qualifies as “major” or “minor” will
need to be determined by reference to clear standards such as the amount of licensing revenues,
the number of patents, or the volume of demand letters sent during a particular period of time—
or some combination of such factors.
Similarly, it would make sense to exempt from registration and reporting the types of
NPEs which generally cause little concern. This might include NPEs which are inventors of the
patented technology at issue, educational institutions, or investors who inject a certain amount of
money into research and development activities in a given period. Coupling a broad definition of
NPEs with specific exemptions and exceptions will minimize legislative drafting problems;
otherwise it may be “extremely difficult to definitely state that a certain entity is a PAE”176
which is required to register.
Even if a decision has been made to focus on “major players” and a threshold for
registration and reporting has been set, it will be necessary to anticipate the complexities posed
by NPE business practices that often involve multiple entities. An NPE may be a subsidiary of a
parent corporation, have its own subsidiaries or “special purpose entities,”177 or rely on third
parties to perform tasks related to patent assertion.178 “Sophisticated trolls sue using shell
companies created for the specific purpose of shielding their investors from liability and
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scrutiny.”179 Moreover, new business models are “emerging frequently.”180 An effective law
will have to anticipate these complexities in order to make clear who is subject to the reporting
obligations and to ensure that the information that is gathered is not so fragmented as to be
useless or misleading.
Government ethics laws often require disclosure of the identities of controlling persons
and business partners,181 and sometimes grant exemptions from registration and reporting to
certain persons if relevant information is reported by a related person. These types of laws can
be used as models for structuring an NPE registration and reporting regime.182
2. What Must Be Reported?
The most difficult questions in writing an NPE reporting law are likely to deal with the
issue of what must be reported and how the reporting will be organized. Presumably, the goal is
to produce information that is pertinent, clear, and useful.
The laws imposing registration and reporting requirements on lobbyists often seek to
“follow the money” by tracking expenditures and revenues related to lobbying activities.183 The
idea is that the dark side of lobbying can be exposed, and mitigated by public scrutiny and
condemnation (if the potentially corrupting influence of money on public policy decisions can be
tracked). It might be possible to employ a similar “follow-the-money” approach to the
179
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regulation of NPEs. Documentation of the revenues and expenditures of major NPEs, including
payments to inventors and expenditures on advancement of innovation and technology, would
shed light on whether NPEs enjoy windfall profits that should be taxed or forfeited, in part, to the
state.184 Such options should be considered because part of the solution to the trolling problem is
finding ways to make “trolling a less lucrative endeavor in the first instance.”185
In a press release, “Acacia Research Group, perhaps the largest publicly traded NPE,
reported that in 2011, it paid more in royalties to inventors than it did to the contingent-fee
attorneys who enforced their patents in litigation.”186 If true, this type of information is
potentially useful. However, such data should be reported in a manner that is open to public
scrutiny and backed by penalties for deception.
Another option is to require public filing of all demand letters and similar
communications asserting patent claims. Like the copies of letters that many lawyers in the
United States are required to file if they have engaged in targeted client solicitation,187 such
filings will enable administrators and third parties to review whether an NPE has made
misleading statements to the targets of patent assertion activities. That deception is a serious
problem is evidenced by the fact that the Federal Trade Commission and the attorney generals of
Nebraska and Vermont have all recently initiated actions accusing NPEs of deceptive tactics.188
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Documentation would also permit verification of an NPE’s compliance with any disclosure
obligations imposed by the registration and reporting regime. Disclosures might include: the
identity of the owner of the patent (as opposed to merely who is doing the negotiations or will
receive funds from licensing);189 information about past, pending, or impending judicial
proceedings related to the patent;190 the names and contact information of other persons who
have been targeted with similar infringement allegations; the minimum period that an offer to
license is open for acceptance; and the identities of persons to whom the technology has
previously been licensed. These disclosures are imperative because reliable “[e]mpirical
research . . . requires sufficient past data to evaluate.”191
It is widely reported that the abusive nature of patent trolling is reflected in a mode of
operation that combines dubious patent assertions with low cost licensing demands. However,
there is “little firm empirical evidence supporting this scenario.”192 An examination of the
information disclosed by demand letters that must be publicly filed could provide the data that
policy makers need193 in deciding how to address this alleged problem.
3. How Will Compliance Be Enforced?
An effective registration and reporting regime must be backed by an administrative staff
able to enforce and ensure compliance with its provisions. The registration fees imposed on
NPEs who are required to register should be set at a level sufficient to cover these costs.
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There must be an appropriate range of sanctions. These would include fines up to a
maximum amount per day for noncompliance with registration and reporting obligations.
Criminal sanctions would be appropriate in cases involving intentional violation of the
provisions of the registration and reporting regime.
To be optimally effective, a registration and reporting regime should allow public
scrutiny of reported information because third parties can play a useful role in “alerting
regulators to potential problems.”194 Consequently, reported information should promptly be
made available on the Internet. This would increase chances that third parties will identify actual
or perceived discrepancies in the reported information. Therefore, a regime should include a
process for receiving and investigating complaints and prosecuting violations of the law’s
requirements.

VII.

CONCLUSION
NPEs presently are allowed to operate with too little transparency and legal

accountability. The adoption of legal reforms that require NPEs to reveal pertinent information
to infringement claim targets or to file public reports will be an important step toward piercing
the darkness195 that presently surrounds patent trolling and increases its costs. Gathering reliable
data is “critical”196 both to patent litigation and to reform of the patent system.
Legal reforms built around disclosure and reporting have the potential to minimize the
costs of patent trolling by assisting targets in evaluating infringement claims made by NPEs and
by revealing facts that will help lawmakers to more effectively formulate sound public policy.
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Such reforms are politically feasible. Lawmakers unwilling to commit to broader legislative
changes are often willing to vote to impose disclosure and reporting requirements. Moreover,
such requirements could be adopted at the state level and be patterned on existing rules that
require disclosure of information by lobbyists and impose certain substantive limitations on their
activities.
The great advantage of a registration and reporting regime for NPEs is that it can gather
information that is needed by lawmakers for the formulation of sound public policy and by
trolling targets for the evaluation of the merits of infringement claims. However, such a regime
can only achieve these goals if it is carefully designed and adequately resourced and only if the
information gathered is clear, pertinent, and subject to public scrutiny. Creating such a system is
difficult,197 but doing so could make a valuable contribution to reducing the costs of patent
trolling.
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